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ARTICLE 
 
Fraud and First Amendment 
Protections of False Speech: How United 
States v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional 
Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws 
LARISSA U. LIEBMANN∗ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, an increasing number of state legislatures 
have enacted laws aimed at preventing undercover investigators 
from gaining access to, and disseminating information recorded 
at, agricultural production facilities.  Potential challenges to 
these laws raise important First Amendment concerns.  In the 
2012 ruling of United States v. Alvarez,1 the Supreme Court of 
the United States articulated that false speech is entitled to First 
Amendment protection.  That decision provides important insight 
into the potential success of First Amendment challenges to the 
Ag-Gag laws recently passed in various states.  Whether the Ag-
Gag laws can be classified as restrictions on fraudulent speech is 
integral to understanding whether a court would subject these 
laws to the heightened First Amendment scrutiny outlined in 
Alvarez. 
Based on the framework set forth in Alvarez and principles of 
common law fraud, the Ag-Gag laws would likely not be 
considered restrictions on fraudulent speech, and, as content-
based restrictions on speech, would be subject to a heightened 
level of First Amendment scrutiny.  Further, based on the 
 
∗Larissa U. Liebmann is a Legal Fellow at Potomac Riverkeeper and 
graduated from American University’s Washington College of Law in 2013.  
Many thanks to Bill Eubanks for his help and support on this article. 
 1. See generally United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
1
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analysis set forth for heightened scrutiny in Alvarez, it seems 
unlikely that the Ag-Gag laws would be found constitutional. 
This article first explains the background and functions of 
undercover investigations of agricultural production facilities, 
and explains the bases upon which states pass laws intended to 
prevent these investigations.  It then gives a background of 
research already conducted on the constitutionality of Ag-Gag 
laws, and examines the relevance of the Supreme Court case 
Alvarez.  Based on the analysis provided in Alvarez, the article 
demonstrates that Ag-Gag laws would not be exempt from 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny as fraud statutes.  
Moreover, it demonstrates that, in particular, the Iowa and Utah 
Ag-Gag laws would not survive the heightened scrutiny outlined 
in Alvarez. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Undercover Investigations into Agricultural 
Production Facilities 
Animal protection groups utilize undercover investigations 
into agricultural production facilities to uncover and publicize 
abuses of animals such as cattle and chickens.2  Undercover 
investigators most often gain access to these facilities by 
obtaining employment at an agricultural production facility and 
recording, or otherwise documenting, any abuse witnessed.3  By 
acquiring footage of the conditions that exist in these facilities, 
animal protection organizations hope to reveal illegal or 
inhumane behavior, and gain public support for more humane 
farming methods.4  These investigations have revealed major 
 
 2. See, e.g., Undercover Investigations: Exposing Animal Abuse, MERCY FOR 
ANIMALS, http://www.mercyforanimals.org/investigations.aspx (last visited Mar. 
16, 2014) (describing recent undercover investigations undertaken by Mercy for 
Animals). 
 3. See, e.g., Rampant Cruelty at California Slaughterhouse, COMPASSION 
OVER KILLING (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.cok.net/californiacows/ (“The video, 
filmed by a [Compassion Over Killing] investigator who worked at the facility in 
June and July 2012, documents egregious inhumane treatment, improper 
slaughter methods, and intentional cruelty forced upon these animals in the last 
moments of their lives . . . .”). 
 4. See, e.g., The Hidden Cost of Walmart’s Pork, MERCY FOR ANIMALS, 
http://www.walmartcruelty.com/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (showing video 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss2/6
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violations of food safety and humane farming practices, and have 
prompted action by both the United States Department of 
Agriculture and by companies that purchase products from the 
facilities investigated.5  This can cause economic and other 
consequences for companies engaging in unlawful or inhumane 
practices.6 
II. The Iowa and Utah Ag-Gag Laws 
In March 2012, the legislatures of both Iowa and Utah 
passed laws aimed at limiting the ability of groups and 
individuals to perform these undercover investigations on 
agribusiness.7  Because of the intent and effect of these laws, they 
are classified as “Ag-Gag” laws.  Ag-Gag laws can be defined as 
laws intended to undermine the ability of groups to conduct long-
term, employment-based undercover investigations at 
agricultural production facilities.8 
Obtaining employment at an agribusiness facility is often the 
only way to gain access to the facility, since it is a privately 
owned enterprise.9  Therefore, a necessary aspect of these 
 
footage from a Mercy For Animals undercover investigation, revealing blatant 
animal abuse at a Walmart pork supplier facility); see also Protect Animals 
From Corporate Greed, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, http://protectyourfood.org/the-
law/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2014) (“Under the guise of property rights, ag gag bills 
are intended to prevent consumers from ever seeing the horrors of animal abuse, 
contaminated crops, illegal working conditions, and risky food safety practices . . 
. .”). 
 5. See, e.g., David Zahniser, Central Valley Slaughterhouse Reopens After 
Animal Abuse Claims, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2012, available at http:// 
latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/08/central-valley-slaughterhouse-
reopens.html. 
 6. See id.; see also, Matthew L. Wald, Meat Packer Admits Slaughter of Sick 
Cows, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/03/13/business/13meat.html?ref=westlandhallmarkmeatcompany&_r=0. 
 7. See, e.g., Dan Flynn, Utah Joins Iowa in Protecting Factory Farms From 
Cameras, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews. 
com/2012/03/utah-joins-iowa-in-protecting-factory-farms-from-cameras/. 
 8. See, e.g., Sara Lacy, Comment, Hard to Watch: How Ag-Gag Laws 
Demonstrate the Need for Federal Meat and Poultry Industry Whistleblower 
Protections, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 128-29 (2013) (“These laws . . . focus instead 
on deterring activists from working undercover to expose violations.”). 
 9. See Cody Carlson, The Ag Gag Laws: Hiding Factory Farm Abuses From 
Public Scrutiny, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:06 AM), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-ag-gag-laws-hiding-factory-farm-
abuses-from-public-scrutiny/254674/#. 
3
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undercover investigations is that the investigators apply for 
employment without revealing that their intention is to find, 
record, and share evidence of animal abuse at the facility.10  In 
response to this, a component of Iowa’s and Utah’s respective Ag-
Gag laws is that potential employees cannot make 
misrepresentations upon applying for employment at an 
agricultural production facility.11 
The law in Iowa creates the crime of “agricultural production 
facility fraud” where a person willfully 
[m]akes a false statement or representation as part of an 
application or agreement to be employed at an agricultural 
production facility, if the person knows the statement to be false, 
and makes the statement with an intent to commit an act not 
authorized by the owner of the agricultural production facility, 
knowing that the act is not authorized.12 
Based on this law, employers at agricultural production facilities 
could include a question on their employment applications to the 
effect of: “Do you seek employment at this facility for the purpose 
of making unauthorized recordings?”  If an applicant does not 
answer truthfully, and has the intent of engaging in the 
unauthorized activity, even without the actual act of doing the 
unauthorized activity, then the person could face criminal 
charges in Iowa. 
The aim of the law in Utah is the same, though the 
restrictions on employment are not as far-reaching.  In Utah, a 
person can be found guilty of “agricultural operation interference” 
if the person: (1) “applies for employment at an agricultural 
operation with the intent to record an image of, or sound from, 
the agricultural operation”; (2) “knows, at the time that the 
person accepts employment at the agricultural operation, that the 
owner of the agricultural operation prohibits the employee from 
recording an image of, or sound from, the agricultural operation”; 
 
 10. See id.; see also Undercover Activist Details Secret Filming of Animal 
Abuse & Why “Ag-Gag” Laws May Force Him to Stop, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 9, 
2013), http://www.democracynow.org/2013/4/9/undercover_activist_details_ 
secret_filming_of. 
 11. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(b) (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-
112(2)(c) (West 2013). 
 12. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(b). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss2/6
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and (3) “while employed at, and while present on, the agricultural 
operation, records an image of, or sound from, the agricultural 
operation.”13  In contrast to Iowa’s Ag-Gag law, the Utah law 
requires the unauthorized activity to take place in order for 
criminal consequences to result. 
In addition to creating harsh criminal sanctions, both the 
Iowa and Utah Ag-Gag laws allow for agribusiness to recover 
money damages from those convicted of breaching the laws.14  
This could mean that a conviction under either law would allow 
the agricultural production facility to obtain damages that result 
from the dissemination of the information gathered from the 
facility by the undercover investigator.15 
III. The Proliferation of Ag-Gag Laws and Concerns 
In 1990 and 1991, Kansas,16 North Dakota,17 and Montana18 
passed laws similar to those recently passed in Utah and Iowa.19  
In 2013, Ag-Gag bills were proposed in eleven other states.20  Of 
these, seven bills–in Wyoming,21 Indiana22, Arkansas,23 
 
 13. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(c). 
 14. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2(1) (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302(1) 
(West 2013). 
 15. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-302. 
 16. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827 (West 2013). 
 17. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02 (West 2013). 
 18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-103 (West 2013). 
 19. See Jessica Pitts, Note, “Ag-Gag” Legislation and Public Choice Theory: 
Maintaining A Diffuse Public by Limiting Information, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 95, 
110 (2012) (giving an overview of Ag-Gag laws). 
 20. See Anti-Whistleblower Bills Hide Factory-Farming Abuses From the 
Public, HUMANE SOC’Y (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/ 
campaigns/factory_farming/fact-sheets/ag_gag.html. 
 21. See generally H.R. 0126, 2013 Leg., 62d Sess. (Wyo.). 
 22. See generally S. 373, 118th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013).  This bill 
died in committee.  See Harmful “Ag Gag” Bill Fails in Indiana—The Humane 
Society of the United States Praises Legislature, HUMANE SOC’Y (Mar. 12, 2012), 
http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2012/03/harmful_ag_gag_bil
l_fails_031212.html. 
 23. See generally S. 13, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); S. 14, 89th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).  Senate Bill 13 was delivered to the 
Governor of Arkansas in April 2013, and enacted as Act 1160 in an amended 
form lacking Ag-Gag provisions.  See SB13 – Providing Legal Protection to 
Animal Owners and Their Animals and to Ensure that Only Law Enforcement 
Agencies Investigate Charges of Animal Cruelty, ARK. STATE LEG., 
5
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Pennsylvania,24 Vermont,25 North Carolina,26 and New Mexico27–
include the criminalization of misrepresentations on employment 
applications.  Most of these bills also have provisions that mirror 
the Utah Ag-Gag law provision prohibiting recording and 
dissemination of images or sounds collected at an agricultural 
production facility.28  Other bills, including a law passed in 
Missouri in 2012, take another form of Ag-Gag bills, which 
establish reporting requirements related to recordings of animal 
abuse at agricultural production facilities.29 
Regardless of the form of the Ag-Gag bill or statute, the 
proliferation of these types of legislation has led to concern among 
a wide variety of advocacy groups, including those working on 
civil liberties, public health, food safety, animal welfare, 
environmental protection, and workers’ rights.30  This concern is 
based on the fact that these laws have the effect of insulating the 
activities within agricultural production facilities from the public 
 
http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Pages/BillInformation.aspx?
measureno=SB13 (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
 24. See generally H.B. 683, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa.). 
 25. See generally S. 162, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt.). 
 26. See generally S. 648, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C.). 
 27. See generally S. 552, 2013 Leg., 51st Sess. (N.M.). 
 28. See, e.g., S. 13, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); S. 14, 89th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); S. 648, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(N.C.), S. 552, 2013 Leg., 51st Sess. (N.M.), H.R. 683, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Pa.). But see S. 162, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vt.). 
 29. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.013 (West 2014); A.B. 343, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Cal.).  California Assembly Bill 343 died while in committee.  Tracie Cone, 
Undercover Animal Abuse Bill Killed Before California’s Assembly Agriculture 
Committee Vote, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2013/04/17/undercover-animal-abuse-bill-jim-patterson_n_3103521.html.  
See also L.B. 204, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013); H.R. 110, 2013 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (N.H.); .); H.B. 1191, 108th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2013); S. 1248, 108th 
Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2013).  Tennessee House Bill 1191 and its companion 
Senate Bill 1248 were passed by the House and the Senate, but vetoed by the 
Governor on May 13, 2013.  Tenn. Governor Haslam Vetoes Anti-Whistleblower 
Bill, HUMANE SOC’Y (May 13, 2013), http://www.humanesociety.org/news/ 
press_releases/2013/05/gov-haslam-vetoes-tenn-ag-gag-bill-051313.html.  See 
also S. 648, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C.) (including both the reporting 
requirement and the employment restriction). 
 30. See Statement of Opposition to Proposed “Ag-Gag” Laws From Broad 
Spectrum of Interest Groups, ASPCA, http://www.aspca.org/fight-cruelty/ 
advocacy-center/ag-gag-whistleblower-suppression-legislation/statement-
opposition (last visited Mar. 16, 2014). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss2/6
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eye.31  Reporting requirements serve the goals of Ag-Gag laws by 
preventing activists from demonstrating a pattern of abuse and 
repeated violations of standards.32  Therefore, these bills, by 
decreasing transparency in the industry, are seen as not only a 
barrier to animal protection efforts, but also as a threat to food 
safety, journalism and newsgathering, worker’s rights, and the 
right for the public to have access to information about their 
food’s production and distribution.33 
IV. Background for the Constitutional Analysis of 
the Ag-Gag Laws 
In response to these laws, groups that support undercover 
investigations are seeking means by which these laws may be 
challenged.34  In July 2013, animal protection groups, activists, 
and journalists filed a civil rights complaint challenging the 
constitutionality of the Utah Ag-Gag law.35  Since Ag-Gag laws 
seek to stifle access to, and exchange of, information, and utilize 
means that criminalize the use of false speech or pretense, the 
laws are vulnerable to freedom of speech challenges under the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.36  To 
determine the potential success of a First Amendment challenge, 
it is essential to first determine which level of scrutiny a court 
might apply in determining the constitutionality of the Ag-Gag 
laws. 
In a recent scholarly article, these laws were analyzed from 
the framework of First Amendment protections for newsgathering 
 
 31. See id. 
 32. Alastair Bland, A Legal Twist in The Effort to Ban Cameras From 
Livestock Plants, NPR (Apr. 11, 2013 4:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
thesalt/2013/04/10/176843210/a-legal-twist-in-the-effort-to-ban-cameras-from-
livestock-plants. 
 33. See ASPCA, supra note 30. 
 34. See ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 4. 
 35. See generally Complaint, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 2:13-
CV-00679 (D. Utah July 22, 2013), ECF No. 2. 
 36. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  See generally Jessalee Landfried, Note, Bound 
& Gagged: Potential First Amendment Challenges to “Ag-Gag” Laws, 23 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 377 (2013) (summarizing potential First Amendment 
challenges to Ag-Gag laws). 
7
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to determine what level of scrutiny a court might use.37  As that 
article concluded, there are a number of aspects of Ag-Gag laws 
that support a finding that they should be subject to either 
intermediate or strict scrutiny based on the impact that the laws 
have on newsgathering.38  The laws can be understood to be 
“specifically targeting people engaged in First Amendment 
activities,” and a court may therefore use a heightened level of 
scrutiny, perhaps even strict scrutiny.39  Further supporting the 
use of strict scrutiny is the fact that Ag-Gag laws specifically 
target the expressive activity of activists, and are written so that 
they are not viewpoint neutral, and can act as prior restraints on 
speech.40  The prohibitions on lying on employment applications 
criminalize speech about identity and affiliations, also suggesting 
that strict scrutiny should be used.41  The article further suggests 
that there are other reasons that Ag-Gag laws should be subject 
to at least heightened scrutiny, including because the laws will 
have an impact on conduct “intimately related” to expression, and 
will punish false statements without proof of harm.42 
If, according to the article, Ag-Gag laws were subjected to a 
strict scrutiny standard, a court would likely find the laws to be 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, in violation of the 
requirement that the laws be narrowly tailored to a compelling 
government interest.43  Alternatively, it is also possible that the 
laws would be found unconstitutional under intermediate 
scrutiny, if a court finds the laws are intended to suppress 
speech.44 
Not explored in this analysis is the impact that the Supreme 
Court’s support of First Amendment protections for false speech 
in Alvarez might have on a court’s scrutiny of the Ag-Gag laws.  
In particular, this analysis would apply to Ag-Gag laws that 
criminalize gaining access to agricultural production facilities 
 
 37. See generally Lewis Bollard, Note, Ag-Gag: The Unconstitutionality of 
Laws Restricting Undercover Investigations on Farms, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10960 (2012). 
 38. See id. at 10971. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. at 10972-73. 
 41. Id. at 10974. 
 42. Id. at 10974-75. 
 43. Bollard, supra note 37, at 10976. 
 44. Id. at 10977. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss2/6
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through misstatements, or by making misrepresentations on 
employment applications.  This is because, like a false statement 
about having the Medal of Honor, a false statement on an 
employee application is a form of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.  Material misrepresentations on an employment 
application can be grounds for termination of employment;45 
however, there is scant evidence of private businesses having 
criminal protection against employees lying on job applications.46 
V. Impact of U.S. v. Alvarez on Challenges to                  
Ag-Gag Laws 
In Alvarez, the Stolen Valor Act was found to be 
unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment.47  The 
Stolen Valor Act made it a crime to lie about receiving the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.48  This was because the 
government found the act of lying to be harmful to “the integrity 
and purpose of the Medal.”49  Since the Stolen Valor Act targeted 
the content of a certain type of speech—the act of lying about 
having the medal–the law was categorized as a content-based 
restriction on speech.50  The Plurality agreed that content-based 
restrictions of speech should be subject to heightened scrutiny, 
although three Justices relied on “exacting scrutiny,”51 while two 
Justices relied on “intermediate scrutiny.”52 
Despite this split in the applicable level of scrutiny, the Court 
held that false statements can be subject to First Amendment 
 
 45. See, e.g., Duart v. FMC Wyo. Corp., 72 F.3d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that material misrepresentations on a job application can be rightful 
grounds for termination of employment); Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. 
Supp. 1246, 1255 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (discussing wrongful dismissal claim based 
on misrepresentations made in a job application). 
 46. See, e.g., Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d 245, 246 (8th Cir. 1963) (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), (c)(1) (2012) (making it a crime to lie to a government 
agent, including material misstatements on a job application for a federal job)). 
 47. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551. 
 48.  See 18 U.S.C. § 704(b), (c) (2012). 
 49. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543. 
 50.  See id.; see also Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 
(2002) (“[A]s a general matter, ‘the First Amendment means that government 
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.’” (citations omitted)). 
 51. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543, 2548. 
 52. Id. at 2551-52. 
9
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protection.53  The Court recognized that there is an important 
public interest in providing First Amendment protection to false 
speech,54 and observed that giving the government the power to 
punish false speech could lead to the government selectively 
enforcing the law against certain groups, thereby chilling free 
speech.55  Because of this, the Court rejected the idea that the 
government may make laws that punish falsity and nothing 
more.56 
Recognizing the compelling government interest behind the 
Stolen Valor Act, the Court found that the law was nevertheless 
unconstitutional as a broad, content-based restriction that was 
not the least burdensome means by which to accomplish its 
goals.57  Emphasizing that restricting speech should be a last 
resort when no other means can accomplish a compelling 
government interest, the Court stated, “[t]he remedy for speech 
that is false is speech that is true.  This is the ordinary course in 
a free society.”58 
In reaching its decision, the Court discussed a limited field of 
traditional areas where the government may create content-based 
restrictions on speech.59  One of these areas is fraudulent speech, 
 
 53. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544-45.  But see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“But there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact.  Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially 
advances society's interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate on 
public issues.” (citation omitted)). 
 54. Id. at 2553 (“False factual statements can serve useful human objectives. 
. . . Moreover . . . the threat of criminal prosecution for making a false statement 
can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby “chilling” a kind 
of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s heart.”). 
 55. See id.  The Court noted that 
the pervasiveness of false statements, made for better or for worse 
motives, made thoughtlessly or deliberately, made with or without 
accompanying harm, provides a weapon to a government broadly 
empowered to prosecute falsity without more.  And those who are 
unpopular may fear that the government will use that weapon 
selectively, say by prosecuting a pacifist who supports his cause by 
(falsely) claiming to have been a war hero, while ignoring members 
of other political groups who might make similar false claims. 
 56.  See id. 
 57. See id. at 2548-49. 
 58. Id. at 2550. 
 59.  Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. 
[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have been permitted . . . only 
when confined to the few ‘historic and traditional categories [of 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss2/6
  
576 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31 
described by the Court as, “[w]here false claims are made to effect 
a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say 
offers of employment . . . .”60  The Plurality did not provide 
further clarification as to what exactly is required for false speech 
to be categorized as “fraudulent speech.” 
However, the concurrence of Justices Breyer and Kagan 
sheds some light on what differentiates a statute targeting fraud.  
The government argued that the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 
1001, which makes it a crime to make false statements to a 
government official, suggests that there are no constitutional 
protections for false speech.61  The Justices rejected this 
assertion, stating “[s]tatutes forbidding lying to a government 
official (not under oath) are typically limited to circumstances 
where a lie is likely to work particular and specific harm by 
interfering with the functioning of a government department, and 
those statutes also require a showing of materiality.”62  After 
looking at other similar statutes, the Justices noted that in most 
statutes criminalizing false statements, proof of specific harm 
was required.63 
The Supreme Court’s strong language regarding First 
Amendment protection for false speech provides support for a 
constitutional challenge to the aspects of the Ag-Gag laws 
criminalizing misrepresentations on employment applications.  
The analysis that the Court applied to the Stolen Valor Act 
suggests that Ag-Gag laws could be subject to a heightened level 
of First Amendment scrutiny despite their language aimed at 
preventing false speech.  However, if a court finds that the Ag-
Gag laws fall into the fraudulent speech exemption articulated in 
Alvarez, this heightened scrutiny may not be applied.  Therefore, 
the remainder of this article will focus on, first, whether Ag-Gag 
laws would be considered content-based restrictions on speech 
 
expression] . . . [including] advocacy intended, and likely to incite 
imminent lawless action, . . .  obscenity, . . . defamation, . . . speech 
integral to criminal conduct, . . . so-called ‘fighting words,’ . . . child 
pornography, . . . fraud, . . . true threats, . . . and speech presenting 
some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to 
prevent . . . . (citations omitted). 
 60. Id. at 2547. 
 61. See id. at 2545. 
 62. Id. at 2554 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001). 
 63. Id. 
11
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subject to strict scrutiny; and second, whether these laws would 
be categorized as restricting fraudulent speech.  Finally, the 
article will analyze whether Ag-Gag laws would survive the type 
of scrutiny applied in Alvarez. 
A. Ag-Gag Laws Are Content-Based Restrictions 
on Speech 
The Ag-Gag laws passed in Utah and Iowa could be 
understood to be content-based restrictions on speech.  A law will 
be considered content-based when “the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it 
conveys.”64  The Stolen Valor Act was a restriction on the content 
of speech, because it criminalized lying about having the Medal of 
Honor.65  In this way, the content of speech being restricted, in 
the case of Alvarez, was the ability for someone to give false 
information about the Medal of Honor.  Therefore, the Stolen 
Valor Act was an expression by the government that it disagreed 
with the content of speech when that speech was a lie about being 
awarded the Medal of Honor.  Thus, the Court found that the law 
was a content-based restriction subject to a heightened level of 
First Amendment scrutiny.66 
The Ag-Gag laws in Utah and Iowa criminalize lying on an 
employment application at an agricultural production facility.67  
These laws restrict the content of speech given by a person when 
he or she applies for employment at an agricultural production 
facility.  Through Ag-Gag laws, the government expresses its 
disapproval with certain types of speech made in the context of an 
employment application.  A conviction under these laws is 
contingent on whether or not the statements made are false.  
Therefore, the Ag-Gag laws restrict the content of speech by 
punishing a person based on what sort of speech the person 
makes.  The Ag-Gag laws, like the Stolen Valor Act, are content-
based restrictions on speech because they aim to restrain the type 
of speech allowed on an employment application. 
 
 64. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citation 
omitted). 
 65. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552-53. 
 66. See id. at 2548. 
 67. IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A(1)(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(c). 
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The government’s contention in Alvarez, that the Stolen 
Valor Act is similar to a federal statute prohibiting lying to a 
government official, supports the conclusion that Ag-Gag laws are 
content-based restrictions on speech.68  In defending the Stolen 
Valor Act’s content-based restriction on speech, the government 
asserted that the Court should treat the law similar to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001, which criminalizes lying to a government official about 
official matters.69  If the government asserted that the content-
based Stolen Valor Act should be upheld based on the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, it follows that 18 U.S.C. § 
1001 must also be considered by courts to be a content-based 
restriction.  If a statute criminalizing lying to a government 
official is considered a content-based restriction, then, naturally, 
laws criminalizing lying on an employment application are also 
content-based restrictions. 
Like the Stolen Valor Act, the Ag-Gag laws criminalize 
speech based on its falsity.  Accordingly, since Ag-Gag laws target 
the content of the speech on an employment application, they are 
content-based restrictions on speech subject to strict scrutiny 
under the First Amendment. 
B. Ag-Gag Laws Should Not Be Considered Statutes 
Targeting Fraud for the Purposes of Determining 
the Standard for First Amendment Review 
Even if a law clearly restricts content-based speech, there is a 
list of certain types of speech that courts have ruled that the First 
Amendment does not prevent the government from regulating.  
These include obscenity, fraud, speech integral to criminal 
conduct, and incitement.70  If a court were to find that Ag-Gag 
laws are aimed at preventing fraud, the laws would be subject to 
a lower standard of review.71  However, since the Ag-Gag laws 
fail to demonstrate a causal link between the restricted speech 
and the harm alleged to result from the speech, the laws cannot 
be considered fraud statutes. 
 
 68. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545-46. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551-52. 
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a. The Exemption for Fraudulent Speech 
Requires a Causal Link Between the 
Restricted Speech and Harm Targeted 
by the Statute 
It is well established that a restriction on speech is not 
considered a restriction on fraudulent speech merely by virtue of 
it being labeled as such.72  In order to determine if a court would 
categorize the Iowa and Utah Ag-Gag laws as restrictions on 
fraudulent speech, it is necessary to see if the laws have the 
elements necessary to be categorized as laws preventing fraud.  
Typically, for a misrepresentation to give rise to actionable fraud, 
it must be a misrepresentation or concealment of a fact that is 
material, reasonably calculated to deceive, made with the intent 
to deceive, and that succeeds in deceiving the victim, who suffers 
an injury as a result.73 
When misrepresentations are criminalized as fraud by a 
statute, they do not require all of the elements of common law 
fraud.74  It is undisputed that false speech can only be considered 
fraudulent if it has the potential to cause some harm.75  Criminal 
statutes imposing penalties for misrepresentations are created 
with the understanding that the fraudulent speech, in the very 
least, has the potential to cause some harm, as there would be no 
need to criminalize speech that no one perceives to be harmful.76 
The Supreme Court, in discussing fraudulent speech in 
Alvarez, suggests that fraudulent speech requires more than the 
mere potential to cause harm.  The Court recognized the 
importance of the Congressional Medal of Honor, and understood 
the harm that the government sought to prevent by punishing 
those who misrepresented that they had received this honor.77  
 
 72. See Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 617 (2003). 
 73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
 74. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 476 (2006) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 75. Natali Wyson, Note, Defining Fraud as an Unprotected Category of 
Speech: Why the Ninth Circuit Should Have Upheld the Stolen Valor Act in 
United States v. Alvarez, 2012 BYU L. REV. 671, 682 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
 76. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (criminalizing mail fraud); 15 U.S.C. § 
78j (2012) (criminalizing manipulative and deceptive devices in commerce). 
 77. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct at 2549 (“The Government's interest in protecting 
the integrity of the Medal of Honor is beyond question.”). 
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However, this potential for harm was not enough to compel the 
Court that the Stolen Valor Act targeted fraud.  Instead, the 
Court asserted that “[t]here must be a direct causal link between 
the restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.”78 
This suggests that, for a statute to fall under the fraud 
exception, there must also be a direct causal link between the 
targeted false speech and the perceived harm.  If this proximate 
cause between the false speech and harm does not exist, then the 
statute would not have the required “direct causal link” between 
the restriction and harm that the statute seeks to prevent.  
Therefore, it is likely that any fraud statute that would fall under 
the exception to First Amendment protection would need to have 
the same type of causal link between the misrepresentation and 
the harm sought to redress as is needed in civil fraud actions. 
The requirements for civil actionable fraud varies from state 
to state, though all require “a knowing misrepresentation of a fact 
by one party which induces another party to act or to fail to act, 
which in the end, causes damage to the party relying upon the 
misrepresentation.”79  For civil actions regarding fraud 
perpetrated in the context of job applications, courts have 
required the typical elements of common law fraud, and have 
emphasized the need for the harm to be proximately caused by 
the misrepresentation.80 
The case of Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 
provides a useful lens to view the issue of misrepresentation to 
gain employment, as the action for fraud in that case was based 
on a report of food handling violations at a grocery chain made by 
undercover investigators.81  To access the information, the 
investigators gained employment at the grocery chain by 
misrepresenting information on their job applications.82  The 
resulting report showed Food Lion’s employees engaging in 
 
 78. Id. at 2549 (citation omitted). 
 79. See, e.g., 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 12 (2013) (footnote omitted). 
 80.  Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
 81. Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 510. 
 82. See id. (“With the approval of their superiors, they proceeded to apply for 
jobs with the grocery chain, submitting applications with false identities and 
references and fictitious local addresses. Notably, the applications failed to 
mention the reporters’ concurrent employment with ABC and otherwise 
misrepresented their educational and employment experiences.”). 
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unsanitary meat-handling practices, and caused Food Lion 
substantial losses in profits, good will, and stock value.83  In a 
civil suit, Food Lion sought recovery of “publication damages,” the 
losses that occurred as a result of the public’s response to the 
report created by the investigation.84  In addition, it sought 
recovery of wages paid, and administrative costs incurred, from 
hiring the investigators based on their misrepresentations.85 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
North Carolina found that, since Food Lion made no claim of 
defamation, there was no assertion that the report was false, and 
therefore the misrepresentations made by the investigators were 
not the proximate cause of the publication damages.86  Rather, it 
was the mishandling of food that proximately caused the losses, 
and the mishandling interrupted any causal chain of harm 
created by the misrepresentations.87  On appeal, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
decision on First Amendment grounds, but gave no indication 
that it disagreed with the district court’s reasoning.88  Further, 
the Fourth Circuit found that Food Lion could not recover for 
administrative costs or lost wages, due to lack of proximate 
cause.89 
This requirement of proximate cause for recovery from a 
misrepresentation is analyzed by courts on a state-by-state 
basis.90  However, it is an established element of common law 
 
 83. See id. at 511. 
 84.  See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 959 
(M.D.N.C. 1997), aff'd on other grounds, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 85.  See Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 511. 
 86.  See Food Lion, Inc., 964 F. Supp. at 963 (noting that “tortious activities 
may have enabled access to store areas in which the public was not allowed and 
the consequent opportunity to film people, equipment and events from a 
perspective not available to the ordinary shopper, but it was the food handling 
practices themselves—not the method by which they were recorded or 
published—which caused the loss of consumer confidence.”). 
 87.  See id. 
 88. See Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 522 (“We do not reach the matter of 
proximate cause because an overriding (and settled) First Amendment principle 
precludes the award of publication damages in this case, as ABC has argued to 
the district court and to us.”). 
 89.  See id. at 514 (finding that wages were paid for work well done). 
 90. See, e.g., Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 771 (3d Cir. 
2009) (analyzing the proximate cause requirement for fraud based on 
Pennsylvania law); Shalaby v. Bernzomatic, 281 F.R.D. 565, 574 (S.D. Cal. 2012) 
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fraud, and there is no evidence of a court rejecting the idea that 
there must be a close causal link between the misrepresentation 
and the harm asserted from fraud.91  Courts are hesitant to find 
proximate cause when there are other intervening or underlying 
factors more directly linked to the damages.92  Based on the 
analysis in Alvarez, a fraud statute must have this causal link to 
avoid heightened First Amendment scrutiny. 
b. Ag-Gag Laws Are Not Fraud Statutes 
Because They Lack a Causal Link Between 
the Misrepresentation and the Harm 
Sought to Be Prevented 
Based on common law requirements for recovery from fraud 
and the Supreme Court’s requirement of a direct causal link, for a 
law to be considered a restriction on fraudulent speech, there 
must be a causal link between the misrepresentation targeted 
and the harm the law intends to address.  In order to assess 
whether the provisions in Ag-Gag laws criminalizing employment 
have this required link, the harm that the laws intend to prevent 
must first be identified. 
Neither Iowa’s nor Utah’s Ag-Gag law states within its text 
the harm that each seeks to prevent.93  The statements of 
supporters of each the law may illuminate the intent of the laws.  
Unfortunately, these statements are not particularly unified or 
well recorded.  The following overview focuses on statements by 
state representatives regarding Ag-Gag laws and two major non-
 
(analyzing the proximate cause requirement for fraud based on California law); 
Dist. 1199P Health & Welfare Plan v. Janssen, L.P., 784 F. Supp. 2d 508, 532 
(D.N.J. 2011) (analyzing the proximate cause requirement for fraud based on 
New Jersey law). 
 91. See, e.g., 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud & Deceit § 271 (2014) (“To support an 
action for fraud, the fraud or misrepresentation must be the proximate cause of 
the damages upon which the action is based.” (footnote omitted)).  But see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A Comment (a) (1977)  (“In general, the 
misrepresentation is a legal cause only of those pecuniary losses that are within 
the foreseeable risk of harm that it creates.”). 
 92. See Sonfast Corp. v. York Int’l Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (M.D. Pa. 
1994).  But see Kelley Metal Trading Co. v. Al-Jon/United, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 
1339, 1343 (D. Kan. 1993) (noting that, under Kansas law, proximate cause does 
not mean the only cause, as long as but for the reliance, the damages would not 
have occurred) (citation omitted). 
 93. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.3A; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112. 
17
  
2014] CHALLENGES TO AG-GAG LAWS 583 
profits supporting Ag-Gag laws.  It will then analyze the 
legitimacy of the stated goals of the Ag-Gag laws. 
In regards to the Iowa Ag-Gag law, State Senator Joe Seng 
stated that the law was intended to protect the investments of 
livestock producers, and to prevent exposure to disease and other 
problems that my arise from unauthorized access to agricultural 
production facilities.94  The Iowa Farm Bureau Federation’s 
President supported the law on the basis that it would help keep 
farms safe by assuring transparency regarding the character of 
workers.95  Iowa’s Governor Terry Branstad supported the bill as 
a protection of property rights, and as a means to prevent illegal 
and deceptive practices being used to disrupt agricultural 
production facilities.96 
In Utah, State Senator David Hinkins described the Ag-Gag 
law as one intended to prevent trespass and espionage on the 
operations, protect property rights, and protect the livestock 
business from “the vegetarian people.”97  Utah State 
Representative John Mathis voiced similar reasons for his 
support, such as a desire to stop the groups investigating 
agricultural production facilities from being able to use footage 
from farms to aid their agenda.98 
The non-profit Animal Agriculture Alliance (AAA) touts Ag-
Gag bills as “farm protection legislation,” and supports them as a 
response to protect farms from the impact of undercover 
 
 94. See Rod Boshart, Bill Creates ‘Agricultural Production Facility Fraud,’ 
QUAD CITY TIMES (Feb. 28, 2012 1:52 PM), http://qctimes.com/news/local/bill-
creates-agricultural-production-facility-fraud/article_df54ddd6-6245-11e1-b371-
0019bb2963f4.html. 
 95. See Laurie Johns, Iowa Farm Bureau Supports Revised HF 589 to Protect 
Integrity and Safety of Family Farms, RIVER CITIES’ READER, (Mar. 6, 2012 8:12 
AM), http://www.rcreader.com/news-releases/-iowa-farm-bureau-supports-
revised-hf-589-to-protect-integrity-and-safety-of-family-farms-/. 
 96. See Mike Glover, Branstad Defends Signing Livestock Bill into Law, 
HUTCHINSON NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012 9:00 AM), http://www.kansasagland.com/index. 
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6543:branstad-defends-signing-
livestock-bill-into-law-&catid=42:regional-ag-news&Itemid=84. 
 97. See Majorie Cortez, Bill on Interfering With Agricultural Operations Gets 
Preliminary Nod in Senate, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012 5:53 PM), http:// 
politicalnotebook.blogs.deseretnews.com/2012/03/06/bill-on-interfering-with-
agricultural-operations-gets-preliminary-nod-in-senate/. 
 98. See Josh Loftin, Filming on Farms Could Be Banned in Utah, FOOD MFG. 
(Feb. 27, 2012 12:43 PM), http://www.foodmanufacturing.com/news/2012/02/ 
filming-farms-could-be-banned-utah. 
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investigations into agricultural production facilities.99  
Specifically, the group stated: 
It is imperative that activists be held accountable for their 
actions to undermine farmers, ranchers and meat processors 
through use of videos depicting alleged mistreatment of animals 
for the purposes of gaining media attention and fundraising–all 
in an effort to drive their vegan agenda.100 
The AAA further alleges that videos released from undercover 
investigations are “highly edited” and “attempt to use emotional 
images and scare tactics to discourage Americans from eating 
meat, milk and eggs because they do not believe that we have 
that right.”101  Based on these statements, it seems that this non-
profit supports Ag-Gag laws as a means to protect agribusiness 
from the reputational harm that comes from the allegedly 
misleading videos produced by undercover investigations.  
Further, the AAA bases their support on the purported 
disingenuous intent of animal protection groups, which the group 
understands to be the end of all animal agriculture. 
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has 
been credited with the creation of the text of Ag-Gag laws.102  
Spokesman Bill Meierling explained the intent of the laws 
stating, “[a]t the end of the day it’s about personal property rights 
or the individual right to privacy.”103  ALEC describes its goals 
regarding animal agriculture as deterring “extremist attempts to 
establish animal rights as a public policy objective,” and 
 
 99. See Debate: After Activists Covertly Expose Animal Cruelty, Should They 
Be Targeted With “Ag-Gag” Laws?, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.democracynow.org/2013/4/9/debate_after_activists_covertly_expose_
animal. 
 100. Alliance Applauds Introduction of Bill to Protect Farmers From 
Undercover Extremists, ANIMAL AGRIC. ALLIANCE (Mar. 2, 2011), http://us1. 
campaign-archive2.com/?u=69c4e87210c5554923516496c&id= d1dd7fe219. 
 101. Animal Agric. Alliance, Deceptive Videos Unfairly Attack Farmers, 
FARMS.COM (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.farms.com/farmspages/commentary/ 
detailedcommentary/tabid/192/default.aspx?newsid=36655. 
 102. See Will Potter, “Ag Gag” Bills and Supporters Have Close Ties to ALEC, 
GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.greenisthenewred.com/ 
blog/ag-gag-american-legislative-exchange-council/5947. 
 103. Associated Press, State Bills Seek End to Farm Animal Abuse Videos, FOX 
NEWS (Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/03/17/state-bills-
seek-end-to-farm-animal-abuse-videos/# ixzz2Qn96AWvl. 
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providing “protection of generally accepted agricultural and 
management practices from public or private nuisance suits.”104  
This suggests that ALEC supports Ag-Gag laws as a means to 
prevent violations of privacy, as well as frivolous and damaging 
suits against animal agricultural production facilities.  Further, 
the Ag-Gag laws are seen as a way to combat the perceived 
damaging agenda promoted by undercover investigations by 
animal rights groups. 
These remarks do not provide a clear insight into precisely 
what harm the Ag-Gag laws target.  To summarize, the goals 
behind the Ag-Gag laws that carry the most logical and factual 
weight could be understood to protect property from trespass, and 
privacy violations.  The Ag-Gag laws also can be a means to 
prevent any disruptions to the functioning of the facility as a 
result of unauthorized access, and to protect the reputation of the 
animal agricultural production industry as a whole.  Further, the 
statements by supporters suggest a desire to stifle efforts by 
animal protection groups to promote their agendas. 
There is no case law that supports the idea that gaining 
access to a facility by misrepresenting information on an 
employment application can sustain an action for trespass.105  It 
is also well established that corporations, or other non-human 
entities, have no right to personal privacy.106  Therefore, by 
preventing misrepresentation on an employment application, the 
laws cannot be understood to prevent trespass or violations of the 
privacy of an agricultural facility. 
There is limited information available on what specific 
disruptions at agricultural production facilities the laws seek to 
target.  If the disruptions were understood to be the impact that 
the eventual publications of recordings from the facility could 
have on operations there, then the precedent of Food Lion, Inc. 
would mean that this harm lacks proximate cause to the 
misrepresentation.107  Thus, if the recordings accurately portray 
activities at the facility, any public outcry, lost profits, or 
governmental investigations would stem directly from the 
 
 104. ALEC Agriculture Principles, AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.alec.org/model-legislation/alec-agriculture-principles/. 
 105. Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 518. 
 106. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). 
 107. See Food Lion, Inc., 964 F. Supp. at 962-63. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol31/iss2/6
  
586 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31 
activities taking place at the facility, not from the 
misrepresentation of the employee on the employment 
application. 
If employees that misrepresented information on 
employment applications posed a risk to the day-to-day 
functioning of the facility, this may be a more direct causal link.  
However, there is limited evidence of this harm actually 
occurring, and the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act already 
makes it a federal crime for someone to tamper with operations at 
an agriculture production facility.108  In addition, courts might 
find that the direct cause of the harm to a facility is disruptive 
employee behavior rather than a misrepresentation on an 
employment application. 
Many of the remarks by supporters of the laws, suggest that 
the main purpose of Ag-Gag laws is to prevent the investigative 
reports that cause public outcry against agribusiness.109  Animal 
protection groups that conduct undercover investigations promote 
this same understanding of the Ag-Gag laws.110  If the harm that 
Ag-Gag laws seek to prevent is the undercover investigations and 
the impact of the release of records, then the restrictions on 
misrepresentations on employment applications cannot be 
classified as restricting fraudulent speech.  Any losses to an 
agricultural production facility from the publication of recordings 
would be the direct result of the activities portrayed, not the 
misrepresentation.  If the recordings do not accurately portray 
the activities at the facility, then there could be a cause for 
defamation,111 but false portrayals of the facilities’ activities are 
not what the Ag-Gag laws prohibit. 
Even though they purport to target fraud, Ag-Gag laws fail to 
have a direct link between the harm that the law intends to 
prevent and the speech restricted.  Without this link, it is 
unlikely that a court would find that the laws meet the 
requirements set out in Alvarez for restrictions on fraudulent 
speech.  As explained, in Alvarez, the Court recognized the 
compelling government interest supporting the Stolen Valor Act 
 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2012) (making it a federal crime to intentionally harm 
the property of an animal enterprise). 
 109. See Cortez, supra note 97. 
 110. See HUMANE SOC’Y, supra note 20. 
 111. Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d at 522. 
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and the harm that the law sought to prevent, yet still found that 
the harm and the restriction lacked a link direct enough to pass 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.112  In comparison, Ag-Gag 
laws are based on attenuated, and often unclear, assertions of 
harm.113  Under the Court’s analysis in Alvarez, the Ag-Gag laws 
would not be categorized in the fraud exception to the protection 
of false speech under the First Amendment. 
c. Ag-Gag Laws Would be Subject to a 
Heightened Level of First Amendment 
Scrutiny 
The Supreme Court in Alvarez clearly stated that First 
Amendment protections apply to false speech.114  The Court 
further provided insight into the elements that a law must have 
in order to be categorized as a restriction on fraudulent speech, 
and therefore not be subject to a heightened level of First 
Amendment scrutiny.115  Based on the criteria set forth in 
Alvarez, and the principles of common law fraud, the provisions of 
Iowa’s and Utah’s Ag-Gag laws targeting misrepresentation on 
employment applications cannot be considered restrictions of 
fraudulent speech. 
Since the Ag-Gag laws would not be categorized as an 
exception to First Amendment protections, a court should analyze 
them under the framework set forth in Alvarez.  If a court finds 
that the Ag-Gag laws should be viewed as content-based 
restrictions on free speech, then it should subject the laws to 
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.  In combination with the 
heightened scrutiny argument based on newsgathering 
protections, this provides strong support for courts using a 
heightened level of scrutiny when determining the 
constitutionality of Ag-Gag laws. 
 
 112. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548-49. 
 113. See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text. 
 114. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553. 
 115. Id. at 2547-48. 
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C. Ag-Gag Laws Would Not Pass Scrutiny Under a 
Heightened Level of Review 
In Alvarez, once the Court found that the Stolen Valor Act 
was a content-based restriction on speech, it was subjected to 
“exacting scrutiny,” which functionally appears to be similar to 
strict scrutiny.116  Because of this, the Court first looked at 
whether the Stolen Valor Act had a compelling government 
interest, and then whether the law was narrowly tailored to 
accomplish that interest.117  When the Iowa and Utah Ag-Gag 
laws are analyzed under this analysis, they do not pass a First 
Amendment challenge. 
a. Ag-Gag Laws Do Not Serve a Compelling 
State Interest 
Based on what is known about the intent of Ag-Gag laws, it 
does not appear that the laws serve a compelling state interest.  
However, determining this is difficult absent a clear statement 
from the states passing these laws regarding the motives behind 
them. 
In Alvarez, the Court recognized the compelling interest the 
government had in ensuring people did not lie about having the 
Medal of Honor.118  The Plurality opinion explained the 
importance of the Medal and the sacrifice it represents.119  
Further, the Court expressed an understanding that the 
government had a compelling interest in protecting the sanctity 
of such a great honor.120  The concurring opinion of Justices 
Breyer and Kagan summarizes what the Court considered to be 
substantial justification for a compelling governmental interest: 
[The Stolen Valor Act] seeks to protect the interests of those who 
have sacrificed their health and life for their country.  The 
statute serves this interest by seeking to preserve intact the 
country’s recognition of that sacrifice in the form of military 
 
 116. See id. at 2548. 
 117. Id. at 2548-51. 
 118. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548-49. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 2549. 
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honors.  To permit those who have not earned those honors to 
claim otherwise dilutes the value of the awards.121 
The Justices recognized that the Stolen Valor Act was motivated 
by the convincing purpose of preserving the sanctity of military 
honors. 
The compelling interest of the Stolen Valor Act stands in 
stark contrast to the interests that Ag-Gag laws seek to promote.  
The Ag-Gag laws’ provisions criminalizing misrepresentation is 
one way the laws seek to reach their intended goal.122  In the case 
of laws impeding freedom of speech, the burden is on the 
government to justify the speech restriction.123  However, since 
the states that have enacted Ag-Gag laws have provided little 
explanation of their purpose, the state interest in passing Ag-Gag 
laws must once again be divined from the statements of 
supporters of these laws. 
The analysis above suggests that the overall goal of the Ag-
Gag laws is to prevent information regarding the operation of 
agricultural production facilities from being disseminated to the 
public.  Therefore, it seems that the governmental interest in 
creating Ag-Gag laws is to prevent the public from being exposed 
to information gathered in undercover investigations.  Further, 
most statements suggest that the laws are not aimed at 
protecting the public, but are meant to shield agricultural 
production facilities from the impact that this disclosure to the 
public has on their businesses.124 
Keeping truthful information from the public, even if it is 
thought to protect them from harm, is not recognized as a 
compelling governmental interest.125  For example, in Thompson 
v. Western States Medical Center, the Supreme Court rejected “a 
fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful 
information” as a justification for laws restricting freedom of 
speech.126  Similarly, in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Court 
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noted that, while a governmental interest in protecting the public 
is compelling, a law cannot be justified on the basis of the need to 
protect the public from certain truthful information that the 
government feels will be misused.127  Therefore, even if the public 
was adversely impacted by the decisions it made based on 
exposure to undercover investigations, a court would not find 
restricting access to these undercover investigations to be 
constitutional. 
The rhetoric surrounding Ag-Gag laws suggests that they are 
not created with the protection of the general public in mind.  
Rather, they are a means to protect agribusiness from harms to 
reputation and profit that result from the dissemination of 
undercover investigation information.128  Insulating agricultural 
production facilities from outside scrutiny is not a compelling 
governmental interest, as evidenced by the longstanding support 
of the laws for whistleblower protection.129  In light of the fact 
that there seems to be no assertions of trade secrets by the 
facilities in regard to the need for Ag-Gag laws, and because of 
the impact that practices in agricultural operations can have on 
public health, it seems contrary to the public interest to reduce 
transparency in the agribusiness sector.130 
Absent better justification by the government regarding the 
need for Ag-Gag laws, it seems that unlike the Stolen Valor Act, 
Ag-Gag laws do not serve a compelling government interest.  This 
is because there can be no compelling governmental interest in 
preventing the dissemination of truthful, unprivileged 
information to the public. 
b. Ag-Gag Laws Are Not Narrowly Tailored to 
Accomplish the States’ Interests 
Even if a court were to find that the Ag-Gag laws promote a 
compelling state interest, Ag-Gag laws would not prevail under 
the “narrowly tailored” prong of strict scrutiny.  For a law 
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restricting speech to survive strict scrutiny, the law must be 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.131  
Therefore, if less restrictive means exist to accomplish the same 
ends, then the law cannot withstand strict scrutiny. 
In Alvarez, the Court focused on two failures of the Stolen 
Valor Act: (1) the lack of a direct causal link between the 
restriction imposed and harm to be averted; and (2) the 
government’s failure to demonstrate why the restriction was 
actually necessary to achieve the desired results.132  First, the 
Court saw no evidence that restricting speech about the Medal 
actually promoted the stated interests of protecting the sanctity 
of the Medal.133  Second, the Court found that the government 
“has not shown, and cannot show, why counterspeech would not 
suffice to achieve its interest.”134  The Court recognized that any 
harm caused by the lie could easily be mitigated by truthful 
speech, and found that the Stolen Valor Act was therefore not a 
necessary restriction on speech.135  Since the Stolen Valor Act 
failed to be narrowly tailored, it was thus found to be 
unconstitutional. 
The Ag-Gag laws of Iowa and Utah also fail this test.  Even if 
preventing undercover investigations and the dissemination of 
information from the investigations are understood by a court to 
be a compelling state interest, these laws are not narrowly 
tailored to survive strict scrutiny.  Evidence that the laws are not 
the least restrictive means on speech to accomplish their goals 
can be seen through other versions of these bills being proposed 
in other states.  Not all proposed Ag-Gag laws include a provision 
criminalizing lying on an employment application.136  These bills 
all have the same intent as the Ag-Gag laws in Utah and Iowa.137  
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For example, bills requiring that recordings of animal cruelty be 
reported within a certain period of time are understood as 
attempts to prevent the information gathered during undercover 
investigations from being disseminated directly to the public.138  
Though these types of bills may give rise to their own set of 
constitutional challenges,139 they more directly address the 
perceived threat of the release of information from undercover 
investigation. 
The language in Alvarez also hints at an even less restrictive 
means to prevent the harms that occur to agribusiness as a result 
of the undercover investigation videos.  In Alvarez, the Court 
found that the government had not shown why counterspeech 
was insufficient to combat the harms that the Stolen Valor Act 
sought to address.  In recognizing this, the Court declared: “The 
remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.  This is the 
ordinary course in a free society.  The response to the unreasoned 
is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the 
straightout lie, the simple truth.”140  Through this logic, the 
Court strongly suggests that when an identified harm can be 
combated by greater transparency and freedom of speech, then 
that should be the means used. 
This reasoning supports the idea that there might be more 
effective ways to address the alleged harms to agribusiness that 
result from undercover investigations.  The main reason that 
undercover investigations cause harm is the reaction that the 
public, businesses, and regulatory agencies have to the 
information gathered and disseminated.141  Following this 
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reasoning, a possible solution is to compel animal agricultural 
production facilities to address the content of the information 
that is causing outcry, as well as legal and economic 
repercussions.  Similarly, if the reports by undercover 
investigators are indeed misleading, as the Supreme Court noted, 
rather than passing laws restricting speech, counterspeech is the 
most effective means to combat speech that is in fact misleading 
or false.  By targeting the dissemination of the information, the 
states passing Ag-Gag bills made a clear choice to restrict 
freedom of speech rather than to address the conditions in animal 
agricultural production facilities that create negative 
repercussions to the facilities when brought to light. 
The Ag-Gag laws are not narrowly tailored to address the 
harm that the government seeks to address.  There are 
alternative means by which to accomplish the goal of protecting 
the reputation of agricultural production facilities that more 
directly address the cause of the harm, and do not involve 
restrictions on speech. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court case United States v. Alvarez provides an 
important lens through which to analyze a First Amendment 
challenge to Ag-Gag laws that criminalize lying on an 
agricultural production facility’s employment application.  Based 
on the precedent of Alvarez, these laws would likely be classified 
as content-based restrictions on speech, subject to heightened 
First Amendment scrutiny.  While Alvarez outlines certain 
restrictions on speech that are not subject to heightened scrutiny, 
such as fraud statutes, it is clear that Ag-Gag laws are not in fact 
statutes targeting fraud, and therefore do not fall within the 
exceptions requiring a lesser level of scrutiny.  When the 
heightened scrutiny analysis used by the Court in Alvarez is 
applied to the Ag-Gag laws, there are strong arguments that the 
laws lack a compelling government interest and are not narrowly 
tailored.  Therefore, it is likely that the Ag-Gag laws are 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 
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